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On the Characterization of Local Nash
Equilibria in Continuous Games
Lillian J. Ratliff, Samuel A. Burden,and S. Shankar Sastry,
Abstract
We present a unified framework for characterizing local Nash equilibria in continuous games
on either infinite–dimensional or finite–dimensional non–convex strategy spaces. We provide intrinsic
necessary and sufficient first– and second–order conditions ensuring strategies constitute local Nash
equilibria. We term points satisfying the sufficient conditions differential Nash equilibria. Further, we
provide a sufficient condition (non–degeneracy) guaranteeing differential Nash equilibria are isolated
and show that such equilibria are structurally stable. We present tutorial examples to illustrate our results
and highlight degeneracies that can arise in continuous games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many engineering systems are complex networks in which intelligent actors make decisions
regarding usage of shared, yet scarce, resources. Game theory provides established techniques
for modeling competitive interactions that have emerged as tools for analysis and synthesis of
systems comprised of dynamically–coupled decision–making agents possessing diverse and oft–
opposing interests (see, e.g. [1], [2]). We focus on games with a finite number of agents where
their strategy spaces are continuous, either a finite–dimensional differentiable manifold or an
infinite–dimensional Banach manifold.
Previous work on continuous games with convex strategy spaces and player costs led to global
characterization and computation of Nash equilibria [3]–[5]. Adding constraints led to extensions
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2of nonlinear programming concepts, such as constraint qualification conditions, to games with
generalized Nash equilibria [6]–[8]. Imposing a differentiable structure on the strategy spaces
yielded other global conditions ensuring existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria and Pareto
optima [9]–[11]. In contrast, we aim to analytically characterize and numerically compute local
Nash equilibria in continuous games on non–convex strategy spaces.
Bounding the rationality of agents can result in myopic behavior [12], meaning that agents
seek strategies that that are optimal locally but not necessarily globally. Further, it is common
in engineering applications for strategy spaces or player costs to be non–convex, for example
when an agent’s configuration space is a constrained set or a differentiable manifold [13], [14].
These observations suggest that techniques for characterization and computation of local Nash
equilibria have important practical applications.
Motivated by systems with myopic agents and non–convex strategy spaces, we seek an intrinsic
characterization for local Nash equilibria that is structurally stable and amenable to computation.
By generalizing derivative–based conditions for local optimality in nonlinear programming [15]
and optimal control [16], we provide necessary first– and second–order conditions that local
Nash equilibria must satisfy, and further develop a second–order sufficient condition ensuring
player strategies constitute a local Nash equilibrium. We term points satisfying this sufficient
condition differential Nash equilibria. In contrast to a pure optimization problem, this second–
order condition is insufficient to guarantee a differential Nash equilibrium is isolated; in fact,
games may possess a continuum of differential Nash equilibria. Hence, we introduce an additional
second–order condition ensuring a differential Nash equilibrium is isolated.
Verifying that a strategy constitutes a Nash equilibrium in non–trivial strategy spaces requires
testing that a non–convex inequality constraint is satisfied on an open set, a task we regard
as generally intractable. In contrast, our sufficient conditions for local Nash equilibria require
only the evaluation of player costs and their derivatives at single points. Further, our framework
allows for numerical computations to be carried out when players’ strategy spaces and cost
functions are non–convex. Hence, we provide tractable tools for characterization and computation
of differential Nash equilibria in continuous games.
We show that non–degenerate differential Nash equilibria are structurally stable; hence, mea-
surement noise and modeling errors that give rise to a nearby game do not result in drastically
different equilibrium behavior—a property that is desirable in both the design of games as
3well as inverse modeling of agent behavior in competitive environments. Further, structural
stability ensures that following the flow generated by the gradient of each player’s cost converges
locally to a stable, non–degenerate differential Nash equilibrium. We remark that non–degenerate
differential Nash equilibria are generic in the finite–dimensional case [17].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II we present the game formulation in
both the finite–dimensional and infinite–dimensional case. We follow with the characterization
of local Nash equilibria in Section III. Throughout the paper we carry an example that provides
insight into the importance of the results and in Section V we return to the example in more detail.
Finally, we conclude with discussion in Section VI. The necessary mathematical background and
notation is contained in the Appendix.
II. GAME FORMULATION
The theory of games we consider concerns interaction between a finite number of rational
agents generally having different interests and objectives. We refer to the rational agents as
players. Competition arises due to the fact that the players have opposing interests.
Let us begin by considering a game in which we have n selfish players with competing
interests. The strategy spaces are topological spaces Mi for each i P t1, . . . , nu. Note these can
be finite–dimensional smooth manifolds or infinite–dimensional Banach manifolds. We denote
the joint strategy space by M “śni“1Mi. The players are each interested in minimizing a cost
function representing their interests by choosing an element from their strategy space. We define
player i’s cost to be a twice–differentiable function fi P C2pM,Rq. The following definition
describes the equilibrium behavior we are interested in:
Definition 1: A strategy pu1, . . . , unq P M is a local Nash equilibrium if there exist open
sets Wi ĂMi such that ui P Wi and for each i P t1, . . . , nu
fipu1, . . . , ui, . . . , unq ď fipu1, . . . , u
1
i, . . . , unq, (1)
for all u1i P Wiztuiu. Further, if the above inequalities are strict, then we say pu1, . . . , unq is
a strict local Nash equilibrium. If Wi “ Mi for each i, then pu1, . . . , unq is a global Nash
equilibrium.
Simply put, the above definition says that no player can unilaterally deviate from the Nash
strategy and decrease their cost.
4Before we move on to the characterization of local Nash equilibria, we describe the types of
games the results apply to and why they are important in engineering applications.
Continuous games with finite–dimensional strategy spaces are described by the player strategy
spaces M1, . . . ,Mn and their cost functions pf1, . . . , fnq. They arise in a number of engineering
and economic applications, for instance, in modeling one–shot decision making problems arising
in transportation, communication and power networks [18]–[20]. On the other hand, continuous
games with infinite–dimensional strategy spaces, regarded as open–loop differential games, are
used in engineering applications in which there are agents coupled through dynamics. They arise
in problems such as building energy management [21], travel-time optimization in transportation
networks [22], and integration of renewables into energy systems [23].
Open–loop differential games often come in the following form. Let L2r0, T s denote the space
of square integrable functions from r0, T s Ă R into Rm. For an n–player game, strategy spaces
are Banach manifolds, Mi for i P t1, . . . , nu, modeled on L2r0, T s. For each t P r0, T s, let
xptq P Rn denote the state of the game. The state evolves according to the dynamics
9xptq “ hpxptq, u1ptq, . . . , unptqq @ t P r0, T s (2)
where ui P Mi is player i’s strategy. We assume that hpx, u1, . . . , unq is continuously differ-
entiable, globally Lipschitz continuous and all the derivatives in all its arguments are globally
Lipschitz continuous. We denote by fipu1, . . . , unq “ fˆipxpxp0q,u1,...,unqpT qq player i’s cost func-
tion. The superscript notation on the state x indicates the dependence of the state on the initial
state and the strategies of the players. Each fˆi is assumed twice continuously differentiable so
that each fi is C2–Fre´chet–differentiable [16, Thm. 5.6.10]. We pose each player’s optimization
problem as
min
ui
fˆipx
pxp0q,u1,...,ui,...,unqpT qq. (3)
The costate for player i evolves according to
9piptq “ ´piptq
Bh
Bx
pxptq, u1ptq, . . . , uiptq, . . . , unptqq (4)
with final time condition
pipT q “ Dxfipx
pxp0q,u1,...,ui,...,unqpT qq. (5)
The derivative of the i–th player’s cost function is given by
pDifiqptq “ piptq
Bh
Bui
pxptq, u1, . . . , uiptq, . . . , unptqq. (6)
5Before we dive into the details, let us consider a simple example that exhibits very interesting
behavior.
Example 1 (Betty–Sue): Consider a two player game between Betty and Sue. Let Betty’s
strategy space be M1 “ R and her cost function f1pu1, u2q “ u
2
1
2
´ u1u2. Similarly, let Sue’s
strategy space be M2 “ R and her cost function f2pu1, u2q “ u
2
2
2
´u1u2. This game can be thought
of as an abstraction of two agents in a building occupying adjoining rooms. The first term in
each of their costs represents an energy cost and the second term is a cost from thermodynamic
coupling. The agents try to maintain the temperature at a desired set–point in thermodynamic
equilibrium.
Definition 1 specifies that a point pp, qq is a Nash equilibrium if no player can unilaterally
deviate and decrease their cost, i.e. f1pp, qq ă f1pu1, qq for all u1 P R and f2pp, qq ă f2pp, u2q
for all u2 P R.
Fix Sue’s strategy u2 “ q, and calculate
D1f1 “
Bf1
Bu1
“ u1 ´ q (7)
Then, Betty’s optimal response to Sue playing u2 “ q is u1 “ q. Similarly, if we fix u1 “ p,
then Sue’s optimal response to Betty playing u1 “ p is u2 “ p. For all u1 P Rztqu
´
q2
2
ă
u2
1
2
´ u1q (8)
so that f1pq, qq ă f1pu1, qq for all u1 P Rztqu. Again, similarly, for all u2 P Rztpu
´
p2
2
ă
u2
2
2
´ u2p (9)
so that f2pp, pq ă f2pp, u2q for all u2 P Rztpu. Hence, all the points on the line u1 “ u2 in
M1ˆM2 “ R
2 are strict local Nash equilibria—in fact, they are strict global Nash equilibria. 
As the above example shows, continuous games can exhibit a continuum of equilibria. Through-
out the text we will return to this example.
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF LOCAL NASH EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we characterize local Nash equilibria by paralleling results in nonlinear pro-
gramming and optimal control that provide first– and second–order necessary and sufficient
conditions for local optima.
The following definition of a differential game form is due to Stein [24].
6Definition 2: A differential game form is a differential 1–form ω : M1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ Mn Ñ
T ˚pM1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆMnq defined by
ω “
nÿ
i“1
ψMi ˝ dfi. (10)
where ψMi are the natural bundle maps defined in (28) that annihilate those components of the
covector dfi not corresponding to Mi.
Remark 1: If each Mi is a finite–dimensional manifold of dimension mi, then the differential
game form has the following coordinate representation:
ωϕ “
nÿ
i“1
miÿ
j“1
Bpfi ˝ ϕ
´1q
Byji
dy
j
i (11)
where pU, ϕq is a product chart on M at u “ pu1, . . . , unq with local coordinates py11, . . . ,
ym1
1
, . . . , y1n, . . . , y
mn
n q and where U “
śn
i“1 Ui and ϕ “
Śn
i“1 ϕi. In addition, fi ˝ ϕ´1 is the
coordinate representation of fi for i P t1, . . . , nu. In particular, ϕipuiq “ py1i , . . . , ymii q where
each yji : Ui Ñ R is a coordinate function so that dy
j
i is its derivative. 
The differential game form captures a differential view of the strategic interaction between
the players. Indeed, ω indicates the direction in which the players can change their strategies
to decrease their individual cost functions most rapidly. Note that each player’s cost function
depends on its own choice variable as well as all the other players’ choice variables. However,
each player can only affect their payoff by adjusting their own strategy.
Definition 3: A strategy u “ pu1, . . . , unq PM1ˆ¨ ¨ ¨ˆMn is a differential Nash equilibrium
if ωpuq “ 0 and D2iifipuq is positive–definite for each i P t1, . . . , nu.
The second–order conditions used to define differential Nash equilibria are motivated by results
in nonlinear programming that use first– and second–order conditions to assess whether a critical
point is a local optima [16], [15].
The following proposition provides first– and second–order necessary conditions for local
Nash equilibria. We remark that these conditions are reminiscent of those seen in nonlinear
programming for optimality of critical points.
Proposition 1: If u “ pu1, . . . , unq is a local Nash equilibrium, then ωpuq “ 0 and D2iifipuq
is positive semi-definite for each i P t1, . . . , nu.
Proof: Suppose that u “ pu1, . . . , unq PM is a local Nash equilibrium. Then,
fipuq ď fipu1, . . . , u
1
i, . . . , unq, @ u
1
i PWiztuiu (12)
7for open Wi Ă Mi, i P t1, . . . , nu. Suppose that we have a product chart pU, ϕq, where U “śn
i“1 Ui and ϕ “
Śn
i“1 ϕi, such that u P U .
Let ϕipuiq “ vi for each i. Then, since ϕ is continuous, for each i P t1, . . . , nu, we have that
for all v1i P ϕipWi X Uiqztϕipuiqu,
fi ˝ ϕ
´1pv1, . . . , vi, . . . , vnq ď fi ˝ ϕ
´1pv1, . . . , v
1
i, . . . , vnq. (13)
Now, we apply Proposition 1.1.1 from [15], if Mi is finite–dimensional, or Theorem 4.2.3(1)
and Theorem 4.2.4(a) from [16], if Mi is infinite–dimensional, to fi ˝ϕ´1. We conclude that for
each i P t1, . . . , nu, Dipfi ˝ ϕ´1qpv1, . . . , vnq “ 0 and for all ν P ϕipUi XWiq,
D2iipfi ˝ ϕ
´1qpv1, . . . , vnqpν, νq ě α}ν}
2, (14)
i.e. it is a positive semi–definite bilinear form on ϕipUi XWiq.
Invariance of the stationarity of critical points and the index of the Hessian with respect to
coordinate change gives us ωpuq “ 0 and D2iifipuq is a positive semi–definite for each i P
t1, . . . , nu.
We now show that the conditions defining a differential Nash equilibrium are sufficient to
guarantee a strict local Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1: A differential Nash equilibrium is a strict local Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose that u “ pu1, . . . , unq P M is a differential Nash equilibrium. Then, by the
definition of differential Nash equilibrium, ωpuq “ 0 and D2iifipuq is positive definite for each
i P t1, . . . , nu. The second-derivative conditions imply that D2iipfi˝ϕ´1qpv1, . . . , vnq is a positive–
definite bilinear form where vi “ ϕipuiq for any coordinate chart pU, ϕq, with ϕ “
Ś
i ϕi,
U “
ś
i Ui, and ui P Ui for each i P t1, . . . , nu.
Using the isomorphism introduced in the appendix in (27), ωpuq “ 0 implies that for each
i P t1, . . . , nu, Dipfi ˝ ϕ
´1qpv1, . . . , vnq “ 0. Let Ei be the model space, i.e. the under-
lying Banach space, in either the finite–dimensional or infinite–dimensional case. Applying
either Proposition 1.1.3 from [15] or Theorem 4.2.6 (a) from [16] to to each fi ˝ ϕ´1 with
pϕ1pu1q, . . . , ϕi´1pui´1q, ϕi`1pui`1q, . . . , ϕnpunqq fixed yields a neighborhood Wi Ă Ei such
that for all v1 PWi,
fi ˝ ϕ
´1pv1, . . . , vi, . . . , vnq ă fi ˝ ϕ
´1pv1, . . . , v
1, . . . , vnq. (15)
8Since ϕ is continuous, there exists a neighborhood Vi Ă Mi of ui such that for Vi “ ϕ´1i pWiq
and all u1i P Viztuiu,
fipu1, . . . , ui, . . . , unq ă fipu1, . . . , u
1
i, . . . , unq. (16)
Therefore, differential Nash equilibria are strict local Nash equilibria. Due to the fact that both
ωpuq “ 0 and definiteness of the Hessian are coordinate invariant, this is independent of choice
of coordinate chart.
We remark that the conditions for differential Nash equilibria are not sufficient to guarantee
that an equilibrium is isolated.
Example 1 (Betty–Sue: Continuum of Differential Nash): Returning to the Betty–Sue example,
we can check that at all the points such that u1 “ u2, ωpu1, u2q “ 0 and D2iifipu1, u2q “ 1 ą 0
for each i P t1, 2u. Hence, there is a continuum of differential Nash equilibria in this game. 
We propose a sufficient condition to guarantee that differential Nash equilibria are isolated. We
do so by combining ideas introduced by Rosen for convex games with concepts from Morse
theory, in particular second–order conditions on non–degenerate critical points of real-valued
functions on manifolds.
At a differential Nash equilibrium u “ pu1, . . . , unq, consider the derivative of the differential
game form
dω “
nÿ
i“1
dpψMi ˝ dfiq. (17)
Intrinsically, this derivative is a tensor field dω P T 0
2
pMq; at a point u PM where ωpuq “ 0 it is
a bilinear form constructed from the uniquely determined continuous, symmetric, bilinear forms
td2fipuqu
n
i“1.
Theorem 2: If u “ pu1, . . . , unq is a differential Nash equilibrium and dωpuq is non–degenerate,
then u is an isolated strict local Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Since u is a differential Nash equilibrium, Theorem 1 gives us that it is a strict local
Nash equilibrium. The following argument shows that it is isolated. Choose a coordinate chart
pU, ϕq with ϕ “
Śn
i“1 ϕi and U “
śn
i“1 Ui. Let E denote the underlying model space of the
manifold M1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆMn. Define the map g : E Ñ E by
gpϕpuqq “
nÿ
i“1
Dipfi ˝ ϕ
´1qpϕpuqq (18)
9Note that g is the coordinate representation of the differential game form ω. Zeros of the
function g define critical points of the game and its derivative at critical points is dω. Since
u is a differential Nash equilibrium, ωpuq “ 0. Further, since dωpuq is non–degenerate—the
map Apvqpwq “ dωpuqpv, wq is a linear isomorphism—we can apply the Inverse Function
Theorem [25, Thm. 2.5.2] to get that g is a local diffeomorphism at u, i.e. there exists an
open neighborhood V of u such that the restriction of g to V establishes a diffeomorphism
between V and an open subset of E. Thus, only ϕpuq could be mapped to zero near ϕpuq.
Non–degeneracy of dωpuq is invariant with respect to choice of coordinates. Therefore, u is
isolated.
Definition 4: Differential Nash equilibira u “ pu1, . . . , unq such that dωpuq is non–degenerate
are termed non–degenerate differential Nash equilibria.
Example 1 (Betty–Sue: Degeneracy and Breaking Symmetry): Return again to the Betty–Sue
example in which we showed that there is a continuum of Nash equilibria; in fact, all the points
on the line u1 “ u2 are differential Nash equilibria and at each of these points we have
dωpu1, u2q “
»
– 1 ´1
´1 1
fi
fl (19)
so that detpdωpu1, u2qq “ 0. Hence, all of the equilibria are degenerate. By breaking the symme-
try in the game, we can make p0, 0q a non–degenerate differential Nash equilibrium; i.e. we can
remove all but one of the equilibria. Indeed, let Betty’s cost be given by f˜1pu1, u2q “ u
2
1
2
´au1u2
and let Sue’s cost remain unchanged. Then the local representation of the derivative of the
differential game form rω of the game p rf1, f2q is
drωpu1, u2q “
»
– 1 ´a
´1 1
fi
fl (20)
Thus for any value of a ‰ 1, p0, 0q is a non–degenerate differential Nash equilibrium. This
shows that small modeling errors can remove degenerate differential Nash equilibria. 
In a neighborhood of a non–degenerate differential Nash equilibrium there are no other Nash
equilibria. This property is desirable particularly in applications where a central planner is
designing incentives to induce a socially optimal or otherwise desirable equilibrium that optimizes
the central planner’s cost; if the desired equilibrium resides on a continuum of equilibria, then
due to measurement noise or myopic play, agents may be induced to play a nearby equilibrium
10
that is suboptimal for the central planner. In Section V, we extend Example 1 by introducing a
central planner. But first, we show that non–degenerate differential Nash equilibria are structurally
stable.
IV. STRUCTURAL STABILITY
Examples demonstrate that global Nash equilibria may fail to persist under arbitrarily small
changes in player costs [10]. A natural question arises: do local Nash equilibria persist under
perturbations? Applying structural stability analysis from dynamical systems theory, we answer
this question affirmatively for nondegenerate differential Nash equilibria subject to smooth
perturbations in player costs.
Let M “ M1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆMn and f1, . . . , fn : M Ñ R be C2 player cost functions, ω : M Ñ
T ˚M the associated differential game form (10), and suppose u P M is a non–degenerate
differential Nash equilibrium, i.e. ωpuq “ 0 and dωpuq is non–degenerate. We show that for all
rfi P C8pM,Rq sufficiently close to fi there exists a unique non–degenerate differential Nash
equilibrium ru PM for p rf1, . . . , rfnq near u.
Proposition 2 (Parameterized Structural Stability): Non–degenerate differential Nash equilibria
are parametrically structurally stable: given f1, . . . , fn P C2pM,Rq, ζ1, . . . , ζn P C2pM,Rq, and a
non–degenerate differential Nash equilibrium u PM for pf1, . . . , fnq, there exist neighborhoods
U Ă R of 0 and W Ă M of u such that for all s P U there exists a unique non–degenerate
differential Nash equilibrium rupsq P W for pf1 ` sζ1, . . . , fn ` sζnq.
Proof: Define rfj :M1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆMn ˆ R Ñ R by
rfjpu, sq “ fjpuq ` sζjpuq
and rω :M1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆMn ˆ RÑ T ˚pM1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆMnq by
rωpu, sq “ nÿ
i“1
rψMi ˝ d rfipu, sq
for all s P R and u P M1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆMn and where rψMi : T ˚pM1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆMn ˆ Rq Ñ T ˚pM1 ˆ
¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ Mn ˆ Rq. Observe that D1rωppu1, . . . , unq, 0q is invertible since u is a non–degenerate
differential Nash equilibrium for pf1, . . . , fnq. Therefore by the Implicit Function Theorem [25,
Prop. 3.3.13 (iii)], there exist neighborhoods V Ă R of 0 and W Ă M of u and a smooth
function σ P C8pV,W q such that
@s P V, u P W : rωpu, sq “ 0 ðñ u “ σpsq.
11
Furthermore, since rω is continuously differentiable, there exists a neighborhood U Ă V of 0
such that drωpσpsq, sq is invertible for all s P U . We conclude for all s P U that σpsq PM is the
unique Nash equilibrium for ppf1 ` sζ1q |W , . . . , pfn ` sζnq |W q, and furthermore that σpsq is a
non–degenerate differential Nash equilibrium.
We remark that the preceding analysis extends directly to any finitely–parameterized pertur-
bation. For an arbitrary perturbation, we have the following.
Theorem 3 (Structural Stability): Non–degenerate differential Nash equilibria are structurally
stable: let u PM be a non–degenerate differential Nash equilibrium for pf1, . . . , fnq P C2pM,Rnq.
Then there exist neighborhoods U Ă C2pM,Rnq of pf1, . . . , fnq and W Ă M of u and a
C2 Fre´chet–differentiable function σ P C2pU,W q such that for all p rf1, . . . , rfnq P U the point
σp rf1, . . . , rfnq is the unique non–degenerate differential Nash equilibrium for p rf1, . . . , rf2q in W .
Proof: Consider the operator Ω P C1pC1pM,Rnq ˆM,Rnq defined by
Ωpp rf1, . . . , rfnq, pu1, . . . , unqq “
nÿ
i“1
ψMi ˝ d
rfipu1, . . . , unq. (21)
Note that the right–hand side is the differential game form rωpu1, . . . , unq for the game p rf1, . . . , rfnq.
Suppose that u “ pu1, . . . , unq is a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium. A straight-
forward application of Proposition 2.4.20 [25] implies that the operator Ω is C1 Fre´chet–
differentiable. In addition,
D2Ωppf1, . . . , fnq, pu1, . . . , unqq “ dωpu1, . . . , unq. (22)
Since dωpuq is an isomorphism by assumption, we can apply the Implicit Function Theorem
[25, Prop. 3.3.13 (iii)] to Ω to get an open neighborhood W ĂM of u and V Ă C2pM,Rnq of
pf1, . . . , fnq and a smooth function σ P C2pV,W q such that
@f˜ P V, v PW : Ωpf˜ , vq “ 0ðñ v “ σpf˜q
where f˜ “ pf˜1, . . . , f˜nq. Furthermore, since Ω is continuously differentiable, there exists a
neighborhood U Ă V of pf1, . . . , fnq such that dΩpf˜ , σpf˜qq is invertible for all f˜ P U . Thus, for
all f˜ P U , σpf˜q PM is the unique non–degenerate differential Nash equilibrium.
Let us return to Example 1 and examine what can happen in the degenerate case.
Example 1 (Betty–Sue: Structural Instability): Let us recall again the Betty–Sue example in
which we have a game admitting a continuum of differential Nash equilibria. We can show that
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an arbitrarily small perturbation will make all the equilibria disappear. Indeed, let ε ‰ 0 be
arbitrarily small and consider Betty’s perturbed cost function
f˜1pu1, u2q “
u2
1
2
´ u1u2 ` εu1. (23)
Let Sue’s cost function remain unchanged. Then, all Nash equilibria disappear. Indeed, a neces-
sary condition that a Nash equilibrium pu1, u2q PM1ˆM2 must satisfy is ωpu1, u2q “ 0 thereby
implying D1f˜1pu1, u2q “ u1´u2`ε “ 0 and D2f2pu1, u2q “ u2´u1 “ 0. This can only happen
for ε “ 0. Hence, any perturbation εu1 with ε ‰ 0 will remove all the Nash equilibria. 
On the other hand, equilibria that are stable—thereby attracting using decoupled myopic
approximate best-response—persist under small perturbations [26].
Example 2 (Convergence of Gradient Play): We adopt a dynamical systems perspective of
a two–player game over the strategy space U1 ˆ U2 with player costs f1, f2 : U1 ˆ U2 Ñ R.
Specifically, we consider the continuous–time dynamical system generated by the negative of
the player’s individual gradients:»
– 9u1
9u2
fi
fl “
»
– ´D1f1pu1, u2q
´D2f2pu1, u2q
fi
fl “ ´ωpuq. (24)
If pµ1, µ2q P U1 ˆ U2 is a differential Nash equilibrium, then ωpµ1, µ2q “ 0. These dynamics
are uncoupled in the sense the dynamics 9ui for each player do not depend on the cost function
of the other player. It is known that such uncoupled dynamics need not converge to local Nash
equilibria [27]. However, the subset of non–degenerate differential Nash equilibria where the
spectrum of dω is strictly in the right–half plane (in the finite–dimensional case, this corresponds
to all eigenvalues of dω having strictly positive real parts) are exponentially stable stationary
points of (24) [26, Prop. 4], [25, Thm. 4.3.4]. Theorem 3 shows that convergence of uncoupled
gradient play to such stable non–degenerate differential Nash equilibria persists under small
smooth perturbations to player costs. 
We remark that in the finite–dimensional case we can show that non–degenerate differential
Nash equilibria are generic among local Nash equilibria [17]. Genericity implies that local
Nash equilibria in an open–dense set of continuous games are non–degenerate differential Nash
equilibria. Furthermore, structural stability implies that these equilibria persist under smooth
perturbations to player costs. As a consequence, small modeling errors or environmental distur-
bances generally do not result in games with drastically different equilibrium behavior.
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V. INDUCING A NASH EQUILIBRIUM
The problem of inducing Nash equilibria through incentive mechanisms appears in engineering
applications including energy management [21] and network security [28], [29]. The central
planner aims to shift the Nash equilibrium of the agents’ game to one that is desirable from
its perspective. Thus the central planner optimizes its cost subject to constraints given by the
inequalities that define a Nash equilibrium. This requires verification of non–convex conditions on
an open set—a generally intractable task. A natural solution is to replace these inequalities with
first– and second–order sufficient conditions on each agent’s optimization problem. As the Betty–
Sue example shows (Example 1), these necessary conditions are not enough to guarantee the
desired Nash is isolated; the additional constraint that dω be non–degenerate must be enforced.
Example 1 (Betty–Sue: Inducing Nash): Consider a central planner who desires to optimize
the cost of deviating from the temperature τ :
fppu1, u2q “ pu1 ´ τq
2 ` pu2 ´ τq
2. (25)
The central planner wants to induce the agents to play pu1, u2q “ pτ, τq by selecting a P R and
augmenting Betty’s and Sue’s costs:
rfa
1
pu1, u2q “ f1pu2, u2q `
a
2
pu1 ´ τq
2
rfa
2
pu1, u2q “ f2pu1, u2q `
a
2
pu2 ´ τq
2.
The differential game form of the augmented game p rfa
1
, rfa
2
q is
rωpu1, u2q “ pu1 ´ u2 ` apu1 ´ τqqdu1 ` pu2 ´ u1 ` apu2 ´ τqqdu2
and the second–order differential game form is
drωpu1, u2q “
»
–1` a ´1
´1 1` a
fi
fl .
For any a P p´1,8q, pτ, τq is a differential Nash equilibrium of p rfa
1
, rfa
2
q since rωpτ, τq “ 0
and d2ii rfai pτ, τq ą 0. For any a P p´1, 0s, the game p rfa1 , rfa2 q undesirable behavior. Indeed, recall
Example 2 in which we consider the gradient dynamics for a two player game. For values of
a P p´1, 0q, drω is indefinite so that the equilibrium of the gradient system is a saddle point.
Hence, if agents perform gradient play and happen to initialize on the unstable manifold, then
14
they will not converge to any equilibrium. Further, while a “ 0 seems like a natural choice
since it means not augmenting the players costs at all, it in fact gives rise to a continuum of
equilibria. However, for a ą 0, drω is positive definite so that, as Example 2 points out, the
gradient dynamics will converge and the value of a determines the contraction rate. 
This example indicates how undesirable behavior can arise when the operator dω is degenerate.
Further, if the goal is to induce a particular Nash equilibrium amongst competitive agents,
then it is not enough to consider only necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash equilibria;
inducing stable non–degenerate differential Nash equilibria leads to desirable and structurally
stable behavior.
VI. DISCUSSION
By paralleling results in non–linear programming and optimal control, we developed first–
and second–order necessary and sufficient conditions that characterize local Nash equilibria in
continuous games on both finite– and infinite–dimensional strategy spaces. We further provided
a second–order sufficient condition guaranteeing differential Nash equilibria are non–degenerate
and, hence, isolated. We showed that non–degenerate differential Nash equilibria are structurally
stable and thus small modeling errors or environmental disturbances generally will not result in
games with drastically different equilibrium behavior. Further, as a result of structural stability,
our characterization of non–degenerate differential Nash equilibria is amenable to computation.
We illustrate through an example that such a characterization has value for the design of
incentives to induce a desired equilibria. By enforcing not only non–degeneracy but also stability
of a differential Nash equilibrium, the central planner can ensure that the desired equilibrium is
isolated and that gradient play will converge locally.
APPENDIX
MATHEMATICAL PRELIMIARIES
This appendix contains the standard mathematical objects used throughout this paper (see [25],
[30] for a more detailed introduction).
Suppose that M is second–countable and a Hausdorff topological space. Then a chart on M
is a homeomorphism ϕ from an open subset U of M to an open subset of a Banach space. We
sometimes denote a chart by the pair pU, ϕq. Two charts pU1, ϕ1q and pU2, ϕ2q are Cr–compatible
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if and only if the composition ϕ2 ˝ϕ´11 : ϕ1pU1XU2q Ñ ϕ2pU1XU2q is a Cr–diffeomorphism. A
Cr–atlas on M is a collection of charts tpUα, ϕαquαPA any two of which are Cr–compatible and
such that the Uα’s cover M . A smooth manifold is a topological manifold with a smooth atlas.
We use the term manifold generally; we specify whether it is a finite– or infinite–dimensional
manifold only when it is not clear from context. If a covering by charts takes their values in a
Banach space E, then E is called the model space and we say that M is a Cr–Banach manifold.
We remark that one can form a manifold modeled on any linear space in which one has theory
of differential calculus; we use Banach manifolds so that we can utilize the inverse function
theorem.
Suppose that f : M Ñ N where M,N are Ck–manifolds. We say f is of class Cr with
0 ď r ď k, and we write f P CrpM,Nq, if for each u P M and a chart pV, ψq of N with
fpuq P V , there is a chart pU, ϕq of M satisfying u P U , fpUq Ă V , and such that the local
representation of f , namely ψ ˝ f ˝ ϕ´1, is of class Cr. If N “ R, then ψ can be taken to be
the identity map so that the local representation is given by f ˝ ϕ´1.
Each u PM has an associated tangent space TuM , and the disjoint union of the tangent spaces
is the tangent bundle TM “
š
uPM TuM . The co-tangent space to M at u PM , denoted T ˚uM ,
is the set of all real-valued linear functionals—or, simply, the dual—on the tangent space TuM ,
and the disjoint union of the co–tangent spaces is the co–tangent bundle T ˚M “ šuPM T ˚uM .
Both TM and T ˚M are naturally smooth manifolds [25, Thm. 3.3.10 and Ch. 5.2 resp.].
For a vector space E we define the vector space of continuous pr ` sq–multilinear maps
T rs pEq “ L
r`spE˚, . . . , E˚, E, . . . , E;Rq with s copies of E and r copes of E˚ and where E˚
denotes the dual. We say elements of T rs pEq are tensors on E, contravariant of order r and
covariant of order s. Further, we use the notation T rs pMq to denote the vector bundle of tensors
contravariant of order r and covariant of order s [25, Def. 5.2.9]. In this notation, T 1
0
pMq is
identified with the tangent bundle TM and T 0
1
pMq with the cotangent bundle T ˚M .
Suppose f : M Ñ N is a mapping of one manifold into another, and u PM , then by means
of charts we can interpret the derivative of f on each chart at u as a linear mapping dfpuq :
TuM Ñ TfpuqN. When N “ R, the collection of such maps defines a 1–form df : M Ñ T ˚M .
More generally, a 1–form is a continuous map ω : M Ñ T ˚M satisfying pi ˝ ω “ IdM where
pi : T ˚M ÑM is the natural projection mapping ωppq P T ˚pM to p PM .
A point u P M is said to be a critical point of a map f P CrpM,Rq, r ě 2 if dfpuq “ 0.
16
At a critical point u P M , there is a uniquely determined continuous, symmetric, bilinear form
(termed the Hessian) d2fpuq P T 0
2
pMq such that d2fpuq is defined for all v, w P TuM by d2pf ˝
ϕ´1qpϕpuqqpvϕ, wϕq where ϕ is any product chart at u and vϕ, wϕ are the local representations
of v, w respectively [31, Prop. in §7]. We say d2fpuq is positive semi–definite if there exists
α ě 0 such that for any chart ϕ,
d2pf ˝ ϕ´1qpϕpuqqpv, vq ě α}v}2, @ v P TϕpuqE. (26)
If α ą 0, then we say d2fpuq is positive–definite. Both ωpuq “ 0 and positive definiteness are
invariant with respect to the choice of coordinate chart.
Given a Banach space E and a bounded, symmetric bilinear form B on E, we say that B
is non–degenerate if the linear map A : E Ñ E˚ defined by Apvqpwq “ Bpv, wq is a linear
isomorphism of E onto E˚, otherwise B is degenerate. A critical point u of f is called non–
degenerate if the Hessian of f at u is non–degenerate [31, Def. in §7]. Degeneracy is independent
of the choice of coordinate chart.
Consider smooth manifolds M1, . . . ,Mn. The product space
śn
i“1Mi “ M1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆMn is
naturally a smooth manifold [25, Def. 3.2.4]. In particular, there is an atlas on M1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆMn
composed of product charts pU1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ Un, ϕ1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ ϕnq where pUi, ϕiq is a chart on Mi for
i P t1, . . . , nu. We use the notation
Śn
i“1 ϕi “ ϕ1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ ϕn and
śn
i“1 Ui “ U1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ Un.
There is a canonical isomorphism at each point such that the cotangent bundle of the product
manifold splits:
T ˚pu1,...,unqpM1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆMnq – T
˚
u1
M1 ‘ ¨ ¨ ¨ ‘ T
˚
un
Mn (27)
where ‘ denotes the direct sum of vector spaces. There are natural bundle maps
ψMi : T
˚pM1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆMnq Ñ T
˚pM1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆMnq (28)
annihilating the all the components other than those corresponding to Mi of an element in the
cotangent bundle for each i P t1, . . . , nu. In particular, ψMipω1, . . . , ωnq “ p0, . . . , 0, ωi, 0, . . . , 0q
where ω “ pω1, . . . , ωnq P T ˚u pM1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆMnq and 0 is the zero functional in T ˚ujMj for each
j ‰ i.
Let M “M1ˆ¨ ¨ ¨ˆMn. Given a point u “ pu1, . . . , unq PM , then ιju : Mj ÑM is the natural
inclusion map where ιjupµq “ pu1, . . . , uj´1, µ, uj`1, . . . , unq. Suppose we have a function f :
M Ñ R. Then the derivatives Difpuq of the map µi ÞÑ fpu1, . . . , ui´1, µi, ui`1, . . . , unq where
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µi PMi for each i P t1, . . . , nu are called the partial derivatives of f at u PM [25, Prop. 2.4.12].
They are given by Difpuqpviq “ dfpuqpv¯iq where vi P TuiMi and v¯i “ p0, . . . , 0, vi, 0, . . . , 0q P
TuM . Indeed, dιiu : TuiM Ñ TuM is a map such that dιiupuiqpviq “ v¯i. Hence, by the
chain rule, we have Difpuq “ dpf ˝ ιiuqpuiq “ dfpuq ˝ dιiu. Further, we have that for v “
pv1, . . . , vnq, dfpuqpvq “
řn
i“1Difpuqpviq. For second–order partial derivatives, we use the
notation D2ijfpuq “ DipDjfqpuq.
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